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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) attempts to "level the playing field"
between equipment and other tangible assets by repealing the investment
tax credit that was available only for equipment. This change may not
increase economic efficiency, however, if there exist substantial amounts of
intangible capital. Advertising along with research and development
(R & D) are viewed as investments in goodwill and production expertise.
As forms of intangible capital, they receive the significant tax advantage of
immediate expensing rather than delayed depreciation deductions. This
chapter finds that
Effective tax rates are mismeasured when this investment is ignored.
The United States in 1983 had about $165 billion of advertising capital
and $305 billion of R & D capital, which together makeup 11 percent of
the total capital stock.
The inclusion of this intangible capital with a zero effective tax reduces
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by one-third the gain in efficiency from prior law obtained by repealing
the investment tax credit for equipment.
With more of this untaxed intangible capital, repeal of the investment
tax credit can actually reduce overall efficiency.
The TRA always increases this measure of production efficiency because
it lowers the taxation of other tangible assets at the same time that it
repeals the investment tax credit.
Before the TRA the investment tax credit (ITC) was viewed as favoring
equipment-intensive industries such as those in manufacturing. The stan-
dard view was that nonmanufacturing industries were disadvantaged by
receiving a relatively low portion of tax credits for equipment. Measured
effective tax rates were often high for nonmanufacturing industries, and a
major focus of tax reform was an attempt to "level the playing field" by
repealing the ITC. Not surprisingly, perhaps, "the legislation was opposed
by the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., the National Association of
Manufacturers, ... and a long roster of representatives of corporate Amer-
ica" (Birnbaum and Murray (1987), p. 161).
However, this standard view ignores intangible capital, another set of
assets in which firms invest. Intangible capital is "information" or
"knowledge" that increases the profits of a firm. Intangible capital includes
the knowledge and trust that consumers have for a firm's productsthe
reputation and brand image. It also includes the knowledge that a firm has
of its customers' needs and the know-how essential for providing products
to meet these needs. This know-how may be based on the firm's research
knowledge, production skills, management expertise, and the goodwill of
its employees. Firms invest in intangible capital in many ways, including
advertising, research and development (R & D), employee training, and
customer relations. But unlike investments in tangible assets, the cost of
intangible investments is deducted immediately rather than capitalized and
amortized over a depreciation lifetime. We show that intangible invest-
ments, rather than equipment, were the most tax-favored assets under
prior law. They remain so after tax reform as well. For firms with a
relatively intensive use of intangible capital, expenses may be overstated
for tax and book purposes. Thus profits may be understated, and effective
tax rates are likely to be overstated for such firms.
These firms with an intensive use of intangible capital had much to gain
from the corporate tax rate reduction provided in the TEA. Their intangible
investments were already written off at the earlier high statutory rate and
would generate subsequent income to be taxed at the new low rate. In fact,
tax reform was favored by "such powerhouse companies as General
Motors, IBM, and Procter and Gamble" (Birnbaum and Murray (1987),Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital65
p. 161). Later, we measure intangible capital and find that its ratio to total
capital is highest in transportation equipment and ordnance, second in
motor vehicles (including General Motors), third in finance and insurance,
fourth in chemicals and rubber (including Procter and Gamble), and fifth in
machinery (including IBM).
Mismeasurement extends beyond the "average effective tax rate," or
ratio of taxes paid to capital income. It also affects the "marginal effective
tax rate," which expresses the future tax on a marginal investment as a
fraction of the expected future income. Many studies have calculated these
rates for tangible assets such as equipment, structures, land, and invento-
ries, but they often omit intangible capital. If the statutory rate is constant,
the marginal effective tax rate is zero on intangible capital becausean
immediate deduction for the outlay is equivalent in present value to
exempting from tax all future income generated by the asset.
These marginal effective tax rates are often used to measure the economic
cost of tax distortions and misallocations. We calculate the "welfare cost,"
or the dollar cost of production inefficiency, attributable to tax differences
among corporate assets. With only tangible assets such as equipment,
structures, inventories, and land in the corporate sector, tax differences
under the old law create welfare costs of about $10 billion per year, or 13
percent of federal and state corporate tax revenue. These results accord
with existing estimates, where the major distortion is the low tax on
equipment due to investment credits. This welfare cost is virtually elinii-
nated by a reform that includes repeal of the ITC.
The existence of intangible capital markedly alters welfare cost calcula-
tions because the effective rate of tax on these assets is even less than that
on equipment under prior law. We provide alternative measures of the
intangible capital stock. With large tax differences between intangible
assets and other assets, using our basic measure of intangible capital, we
find that the welfare cost measure increases from $10 billion to $13 billion
per year. As pointed out by Summers (1987), repeal of the investment
credit taxes equipment more like other tangible assets but less like intangi-
ble assets. The welfare cost still falls, to about $7 billion per year, but it is no
longer "virtually eliminated." Our basic estimate of intangible capital is
constructed by considering only advertising and R & D expenditures. With
additional sources of intangible capital, credit repeal could actually increase
welfare costs.
Finally, we note that the TRA also reduced the statutory corporate rate
that applies to tangible assets. That is, it does not just raise the tax on
equipment (away from intangibles), it also reduces the tax on other
tangibles (toward intangibles). With our basic measure of intangible capital,
the efficiency cost falls from $13 billion per year under the old law to $466Fullerton & Lyon
billion per year under the new law. No amount of increase in the stock of
intangible capital in this model reverses the finding that the TRA reduces
interasset distortions.
This finding does not mean that the new law is perfectly efficient. There
remain tax advantages to investment in advertising, R & D, and other
intangible capital. The subsidy to R & D might be justified by the existence
of "external spillover benefits": the firm may not receive all of the returns
to its discoveries and therefore may not have sufficient incentive to
undertake research. Calculations below show the efficiency-improving
nature of the subsidy in the presence of such an externality. It is more
difficult to justify the advantage to advertising, however. Calculations with
a reduction of this benefit show the greatestefficiency gain of all.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section shows how
average and marginal effective tax rates are affected by the existenceof
intangible capital. The second section discusses the nature of intangible
capital and the procedures we use to measure it. Tables show the relative
use of each type of tangible and intangible capital in each industry.The
third section further discusses the tax treatment of tangible and intangible
capital; specifics of our tax and efficiency cost calculations are relegated to
an appendix. The fourth section reportsresults of our efficiency cost
calculations. The final section summarizes our findings and conclusions.
1. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
Much of the discussion about tax differences revolves around measures of
effective tax rates that take the ratio of taxes paid to capital income in each
industry. This "average" effective tax rate has been used by many to
identify high-taxed and low-taxed sectors of the economy. For other
applications, such as measuring the effect of taxes on investment incen-
tives, this measure suffers from a number of problems. First, as an
aggregate measure, it cannot distinguish the taxation of income earned
from the various types of assets in which firms invest. Second, it looks
backward at the taxes paid in a given year, rather than forward at the taxes
that would be paid on the future income generated by a new investment
under consideration in that year. Fullerton (1984) describes many reasons
that may cause the two concepts to differ.
For these reasons, many choose to characterize tax differences by the cost
of capital or "marginal" effective tax rate. This rate can be calculated for
each asset, and it compares the present value of taxes expected to be paid
over the life of a given investment with the gross incomeexpected to be
generated. It is a "marginal" effective tax rate because it is calculated for an
investment that is expected to yield a return just equal to the cost of funds.Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital67
Here, however we would like to emphasize that past measures of both
average and marginal effective tax rates often do not account for intangible
capital and thus mischaracterize tax differencesacross industries. An
industry that makes extensive use of intangible capitalmay pay a tax that
is relatively low, even though past reportedmeasures of average or
marginal effective tax rates have been characterizedas relatively high.
The key feature of intangible capital is that firmscan expense it.' In
accordance with generally accepted accounting practices, advertising and
R & D expenses are deducted immediately, for both book and taxpurposes.
If the firm is growing, the deduction for current investments in advertising
and R & D is larger than a deduction for economic depreciation of existing
intangible assets. Thus expenses are overstated, profits are understated,2
and the ratio of taxes to profits is overstated. This is the mismeasurement
mentioned above: average effective tax rates may not have beenso high in
industries receiving the tax advantages of expensing intangible invest-
ments.
Because an immediate deduction for the initial expenditureon intangible
capital is equivalent to exempting the entire income stream from the
investment, the marginal effective tax rate of intangible capital iszero. If
industries differ in their relative use of intangible capital, comparisons of
marginal effective tax rates that excluded the taxation of intangible capital
may be misleading
An example using actual tax data may help demonstrate the tax advan-
tage of expensing intangible capital and the mismeasurement of tax rates.
In 1983, corporations in the chemical and rubber industry had taxable
income after deductions of $15.9 million.3 The tax liabifity of this industry
after the use of tax credits was $3.15 million. The ratio of taxes paid to
taxable income is 19.8 percent.
Using data described later in this paper, we calculate that firms in this
industry spent $15.5 million in advertising and R & D in 1983. Taxable
income before the expensing of these intangible investments is therefore
$31.4 million ($15.9 mfflion plus $15.5 million). To measure economic
income, however, firms should be allowed a deduction for the depreciation
of the existing stock of intangible capital. We calculate that total economic
depreciation of advertising and R & D capital in this industry is $13.4
1For an elaboration of the tax treatment of intangible capital, see Mundstock (1987).
2Although the amount of profit is understated, profit rates are likely to be overstated if capital
in the denominator excludes intangible capital.
All tax and income data are from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of income-1983,
corporate income tax returns. The construction of our data on intangible capital expenditures is
described in section 2.68Fullerton & Lyon
million. Subtracting this amount from the $31.4 million yields taxable
income equal to $18.0 million. Actual taxes paid as a fraction of this income
is 17.5 percent, about 10 percent less than without this correctiori. Thus
previously reported effective tax rates were overstated.
Finally, if firms in this industry were required to deduct only economic
depreciation of advertising and R & D capital, tax payments at a 46 percent
statutory tax rate would have been nearly $1.0 million higher, or 22.9
percent of the restated taxable income. As shown in this example, some
industries may receive a significant tax advantage from the expensing of
these intangible investments.
2. THE MEASUREMENT OF INTANGIBLE CAPITAL
Conceptually, the firm's stock of intangible capital includes its patents,
trademarks, copyrights, customer lists, reputation, and any firm-specific
knowledge about technology, marketing, or production. These assets may
be specific to the firm and difficult to sell in the market, but they are assets
nonetheless. They wear out or become obsolete just like other assets,
requiring reinvestment to maintain their stock. Although the return to any
particular investment may be uncertain, in the aggregate these investments
must be expected to generate a viable rate of return since they utilize funds
that could have been profitably invested elsewhere.
For many assets, value can be measured using data from market
transactions, but intangible assets are rarely bought and sold. For tangible
assets in the national accounts, the Commerce Department and others
measure capital by the "perpetual inventory" method. Starting with a time
series on investment in equipment, for example, and using assumptions
about economic depreciation, this procedure simply starts with the earliest
available year, adds investment, subtracts depreciation, accounts for infla-
tion, and repeats for successive years up through the most recently
available year.
The same procedure can be followed for intangible capital, once the
proper investment series and rate of depreciation are established. Time
series data are available for advertising and R & D, but not all of these
expenditures generate future income. Much advertising information is
used by customers immediately, and much research may never pay off. In
fact, for a given firm, expenditures on R & D may bear little relation to
intangible capital: small R & D in one firm may lead to dramatic scientific
discoveries, whereas much R & D in another firm may not. Firms likely
invest in R & D until the expense is matched by the expected future value of
the intangible asset, however, so the aggregation of many firms in theTax Neutrality and Intangible Capital69
economy or even with one industry may provide a good correspondence
between R & D expenditures and subsequent intangible capital.
Some previous research has been directed toward measuring intangible
capital. Much of this literature relates to prior claims that industries with
high rates of return must have entry barriers and monopoly profits.When
measures of intangible capital were added to the denominator of each
industry's rate of return, there was much less variation. Clarkson(197?), for
example, uses time series on advertising and R & Dexpenses from a
sample of sixty-nine firms representing eleven manufacturingindustries.
For depreciation, he cites various studies that "indicate that theeconomic
life of advertising capital ranges from less thanone year in one industiy to
more than ten years in some..." (p. 41), whereas "estimates of the average
life cycle of a pharmaceutical product, including research and development
time, range from twenty to thirty years" (p. 43). He choosesto assume
three-year straight-line depreciation for advertising; basic researchexpen-
ditures are assumed to last for periods of eighteen to twenty-oneyears, and
development expenditures last for thirteen to sixteenyears. Sensitivity
analyses on alternative assumptions do not substantially affect hismajor
conclusion, namely, that proper measurement reduces the variationof
rates of return among industries. Grabowski and Mueller (1978)use a
questionnaire study concerning mean R & D project durations and R & D
output life-spans. They assign each of the eighty-six firms in their sample
to one of nine manufacturing industries and find that "a depreciationrate
of 10 percent would be a plausible starting point for all ofour industries
except pharmaceuticals" (p. 334). They cite other studies showing faster
depreciation of advertising, so they usea 30 percent rate of depreciation for
that type of capital.
Our own procedure is as follows. First,we want comprehensive mea-
sures of advertising and R & D, not just for some firms or just for
manufacturing industries. We take advertising data from annual issuesof
the Statistics of income corporate income tax returns, published by theInternal
Revenue Service of the Treasury Department. Thissource provides corpo-
rate advertising deductions taken by disaggregated manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing industries. From thissource, we construct a time series
on corporate advertising investment in each industry for the period
19?7-1983.
Second, for R & D expenditures, weuse annual issues of Research and
Because of high rates of depreciation assumed for advertising, it is notnecessary to collect
more years of data. We include constructed estimates for investment in advertising before
1977, as discussed below, but these depreciated investments makeup a very small fraction of
the 1983 stocks.70Fullerton & Lyon
development in industry, published by theNational Sciences Foundation. We
separate the R & D expenditures ineach industry into corporate and
noncorporate components, which we assume tobe allocated in proportion
to the tangible capital stock in each sectorfor each industry. Although the
thta are provided with sufficient breakdown amongmanufacturing indus-
tries, we are forced to allocate asingle relatively small figure of the
nonmanufacturing sector among severalnonmanufacturing industries us-
ing IRS data on the distribution of R &D credits. At this point, we construct
a time series on corporateR & D in each industry for the period 1963-1983.
Third, to account for each type of intangiblecapital at the beginning of
the time series, we (a) measure the rateof growth of investment in the asset
in each industry during the timeperiod, (b) assume that prior investment
grew at the same rate,and (c) construct an infinite series for prior
investment.
Finally, we construct a measure of the stockof each intangible asset as of
the end of 1983 in a manner similar to theperpetual inventory method used
by the Commerce Department fortangible capital. Thus the stock for
year-end 1983 includes investment in 1983 with ahalf year's depreciation
and inflation, 1982 investment with one and ahalf years of depreciation
and inflation and similarly for earlier years.We undertake considerable
sensitivity analysis on annual rates of depreciation.For advertising, we use
rates of one-sixth, one-third, andone-half. For R & D, the rates are 0.10,
0.15, and 0.20. Our central estimates areone-third for advertising and 0.15
for R & D.
Measured stocks of intangible capital are shownin Table 1, where the
central depreciation choices imply $165billion of advertising capital, $305
billion of R & D capital, and $470 bfflion oftotal intangible capital. This total
could be as low as $330 billion with thehigh depreciation assumptions or
as high as $775 billionwith the low depreciation assumptions. Under any
assumptions, the largest amount of advertisingcapital is in wholesale and
retail trade, followed by food and tobacco,metals and machinery, chemi-
cals and rubber, and finance and insurance.The most R & D is in our large
metals and machinery industry, followedby transportation equipment
(including ordnance), chemicals and rubber(including drugs), and motor
vehicles.
More important to each industry, however,is the relative use of different
capital types. Thus we need measures oftangible capital types used in each
industry, and we need to combine severaldata sources. The Commerce
Depai liiient's Survey of current businessprovides equipment and structures
by industry, but not land and inventories.The Federal Reserve Board's
Balance sheets of the U.S. economy providesinventories and land, but only in




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by industry, but only for 1977. We therefore adjustedthe 1977 matrix until
it matched appropriate totals for 1983.These data are very similar to the
tangible capital data used in earlier efficiency cost calculationsby Gravelle
(1982), Auerbach (1983), and Fullerton and Henderson(1986).
In Table 2 we show the ratio of each type of capital tototal capital in each
industry. The most advertising-intensive industry is financeand insurance,
followed by food and tobacco. The trade industryfalls in this relative
ranking because it uses large amounts of other assets,particularly inven-
tories; finance and insurance rises in this rankingbecause it uses small
amounts of other tangible assets. The most R &Dintensive industry by far
is transportation equipment, followed by motorvehicles. Metals and
machinery had the highest absolute amount of R & Dcapital, but is third
in this ranking of relative intensity. It is followedby chemicals and rubber.
This measure of intangible capital constitutes about 11 percentof the total
capital stock. With extreme assumptions about depreciationrates, this
figure could almost double. The problem of setting depreciationrates is
modest, however, compared to the problem that advertising(as reported to
the IRS) and R & D expenditures may only accountfor a small part of total
investment in intangible capital. First, much of what oneconsiders adver-
tising may be deductible as another allowable business expense.For
example, a company that hires a consultant to mount anadvertising
campaign could properly deduct this expense as a consultantfee rather
than as advertising. The costs of consumer relationsdivisions and sales
personnel are deductible largely as wages. Second, firms maytake less
direct methods to create intangible capital. Although advertisingis one way
to create a reputation, a new firm maysell at lower margins or take greater
care in production or customer service as analternative way to create
intangible capital.5 Here, forgone profits is the mechanismby which the
firm invests in future reputation. Firms also invest in thefuture productiv-
ity of their labor force through recruiting and training.Our basic measure
of intangible capital is probably an understatement of thetotal intangible
capital stock.
There are no appropriate time series data for the amountsof all such
investment, so the perpetual inventory method can neverbe comprehen-
sive. In related research, we are investigatingalternative methods of
measuring intangible capital. One method would reversethe logic of
above-mentioned attempts to measure variations in the return toproperly
measured capital: assume instead an equilibrium where all typesof capital
If consumers have full information about the quality of the product,then extra production
costs may not create intangible capital. It may take time, however,for consumers to recognize

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































must earn the same net rate of return.For each industry, we can then
divide total net income by the assumed net rateof return to derive the total
capital stock, and subtract estimates of tangiblecapital to get the implied
intangible capital stock. Problems include measuringcapital income, choos-
ing a rate of return, and accounting forrisk differentials.
A second possible method would take thetotal valuation of capital in the
stock market and subtract tangible capital. Problemshere include transitory
influences and correction for taxes. In fact,the market value of the capital
stock divided by its replacement cost is q, aratio that is expected to depend
on taxes and to influenceinvestment. It is typically measured by market
value over tangible capital stock. Asmeasured, however, this ratio might
exceed 1 if shareholders value intangiblecapital. Lindenberg and Ross
(1981) found that average q was 1.5 over theperiod 1960-1977 for a large
sample of firms. If the entire difference betweenthe firms' market value
and the replacement value of their tangiblecapital stock is attributable to
intangible capital, then intangible capital could be aslarge as one-third of
the total capital stock. Further, time seriesestimates of the effects of
taxation on investment using q, such as those inSummers (1981), could be
misleading if intangible investments are not just aconstant fraction of
tangible investments used in the estimation.Even more likely is that
intangible capital is not a constant fractionof tangible capital across
industries. Thus estimated q would be expected todiffer among industries
for more than tax reasons.
This other work is not complete, but a simplecalculation reveals the
possible importance of intangible capital.Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and
Poterba (1983) indicate that net capital incomedivided by tangible capital
varies between about 3 and 4 percent. If the properlymeasured net rate of
return were only 2 percent, for example,then the stock of intangibles
would be one-third to one-half of the total capitalstock. This is four to eight
times the estimate of intangible capital fromthe perpetual inventory
method.
We can represent the possibility of greaterintangible capital by multi-
plying the basic estimates of advertising and R & Dcapital by integers from
1 to 8, or more. We show how efficiency costestimates depend on the
quantity of intangible capital.
3. TAX DISTORTIONS ANDEFFICIENCY COSTS
To measure the efficiency cost of tax distortions, we usethe cost of capital
or marginal effective tax ratein this paper. First, we assume certain
conditions about the future environment formarginal investments cur-Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital75
rently under consideration. In particular,we assume that all investments
wifi earn a risk-free nominal after-tax return of 8.5percent, that inflation
wifi run at 4 percent, and that firms facea set of tax rules including federal
and state statutory corporate tax rates, investment tax creditrates, depre-
ciation allowances, and local property tax rates thatmay vary by asset. (See
King and Fullerton (1984) for derivation of theseparameters under prior
law.) Second, we assume that firms will undertake allinvestments for
which the present value of all net returns exceeds the outlay forthe asset.
They stop investing when the present value ofnet returns just equals the
outlay. Third, this equality can be used to solve for the realpretax return on
the marginal investment that just allows the firmto earn the assumed 8.5
percent net return (4.5 percent after inflation). The equation is shown in the
Appendix. This required pretax return is the "cost ofcapital" net of
depreciation, because it includes tax costs and financingcosts (the required
net return). Finally, the marginal effective tax rate is the difference between
this real pretax return and the 4.5 percent realposttax return, as a fraction
of the real pretax return.
Only the cost of capital is used in subsequent calculations, andit does not
depend upon actual choices for financing the marginalinvestment. With
arbitrage by the firm among various real and financialassets in this risk-free
world, all assets would have to earn thesame net return. For example,
arbitrage between debt and real capitalassures that any asset must earn the
after-tax interest rate. All investments thus have thesame assumed 4.5
percent real cost of funds, regardless of actual financing.6 The effectivetax
rate, calculated only to help interpretations, is the fraction of thecost of
capital that would be attributable to business taxes if theinvestment were
financed by equity.
An advantage of this approach is thatwe do not have to deal with
personal tax changes. Although increases in personalexemptions and
reductions in personal rates were crucial components oftax reform, they do
not relate in this model to the firm's choice among capital assets. Similarly,
we abstract from other detailed aspects of tax law that are not directly
related to this allocative decision, including passive loss rules,minimum
tax, accounting provisions,7 at-risk rules, bad-debtreserves, foreign tax
6In a different model, it is possible that financing proportions could affectthe cost of capital.
Bosworth (1985) and others have pointed out that structures mightuse relatively more debt
finance and take greater advantage of interest deductions. Also,churning might have
provided greater tax advantages to real estate, as discussed in Gordon, Hines,and Summers
(1987). Other problems are discussed in Summers (1987).
Fullerton, Gillette, and Macide (1987) consider accounting rule changesand argue that (a)
much of the revenue is from existing investment and does not applyto new investment, (b)
some of the changes are best modeled as reduced output subsidies rather than reduced76Fullerton & Lyon
provisions, and loss carryforwards.8 To simplify further, wedo not model
the intricate R & D credit.9 The model captures theimportant conceptual
distinction that advertising and R & D are capital assetssubstantially
favored under both old and new laws. These investments arestill ex-
pensed, while other assets lose their ITCs oraccelerated depreciation
allowances.
The effective tax rate includes all business level taxes onthe corporation.
It would just equal the statutory rate (34 percent underpresent law) if there
were no state taxes or property taxesand if cost recovery were based on
economic depreciation at replacement cost. Stateand local taxes raise the
effective rate, whereas the ITC (a maximum 10 percentunder prior law)
and accelerated depreciation allowances lower it.With no local property tax
on intangible capital, the effective rateis zero because an immediate
deduction for the initial outlay is equivalent in presentvalue to exempting
the entire income stream. For other assets, wesummarize complicated
depreciation allowances in a single parameter for theexponential rate of tax
depreciation. We report for all equipment and for all structuresthe annual
rate of depreciation on historical cost thatwould provide the same present
value of allowances as the actual law.'°
These tax parameters for present law, asprovided by the TRA, are
shown in Table 3 for our six assets. Theexponential rate of economic
depreciation for equipment is 0.13, derived by averaging overestimates in
Hulten and Wykoff (1981) for twenty kinds of equipment.Comparison
with the 0.38 exponential rate for tax depreciationindicates the degree of
acceleration for equipment, but inflation erodes thereal value of these
allowances since they are based on historical cost.For structures, the
average exponential rate of economicdepreciation is 0.03, and the rate for
investment incentives, and (c) remaining changes have asmall effect on marginal effective tax
rates.
8Any of these aspects may have some effect on our results.For example, Hulten and
Robertson (1984) point out that start-up firms may invest relativelyheavily in advertising or
R & D but may be least able to expense these investments. Early losses meanthat deductions
must be carried forward and might be lost altogether.
9Incentive effects of the incremental R & D credit can be small, or evennegative, depending
on the circumstances of the firm. See Eisner,Albert, and Sullivan (1984). Details of the effects
of tax reform on R & D are provided in Cordes, Watson, and Hauger(1987).
10Fullerton and Henderson (1986) provide present-value calculationsfor depreciation under
the old law where many diverse types of equipment receive150 percent of declining balance,
and structures receive 175 percent of declining balance, bothswitching to straight line. They
set a lifetime for each asset, incorporate the half-year convention,and adjust the basis for half
the ITC. Similar calculations apply to the new law withdouble declining balance for
equipment of different lives, and straight line for nonresidential structureswith a 31.5-year
life.Asset
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TABLE 3
Tax Parameters and the Cost of Capital under1986 Law for Each Asset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exponential
economicExponential CostRealEffective tax
depreciation rate for tax Propertyof net rate
rate depreciation tax rate capital return [(4)- (5)]I(4)
Equipment 0.130 0.380 0.0080.0730.045 0.380
Structures 0.030 0.076 0.0110.0810.045 0.443
Inventories 0.000 0.000 0.0080.0810.045 0.442
Land 0.000 0.000 0.0110.0840.045 0.466
Advertising 0.333 0.0000.0450.045 0.000
R & D capital 0.150 0.0000.0450.045 0.000
Note: The cost of capital is defined here to begross of tax but net of depreciation. It is
based on equation (1) of the Appendix, usinga corporate rate of 0.383 including state
corporate taxes, a discount rate of 0.085, an inflation rate of 0.04, and thereforea real net return of 0.045 as shown in the table.
tax depreciation on historical cost is 0.076. Inventories and land effectively
receive economic depreciation allowances, since they donot depreciate and
do not get deductions. Effective tax rates for these twoassets would match
the 0.383 combined federal and state statutory rate,except that local
property taxes push them up to 44 and 47 percent, respectively. The
effective rate for structures is 44 percent. The effectivetax rate for equip-
ment is 38 percent, which indicates that tax depreciation isa little more
generous than economic depreciation at an inflation rate of 4 percent.
These differences are all reflected in the cost of capitalin column 4 of
Table 3. The cost of capital under TRA for equipment is 7.3percent, and the
cost of capital for other tangible assets is between 8.1percent and 8.4
percent. Intangible assets have a significantly lower cost of capital of4.5
percent.
Because the pretax return on tangible assets is higherthan that on
intangible assets and into tangible assets, total output could beincreased by
shifting capital out of intangible capital and intotangible assets. For
example, replacement of $1 of intangible capital by $1 ofstructures would
increase output by 3.6 cents, the difference in theirpretax returns (8.1
minus 4.5). To analyze more than marginal changes inthe allocation of
capital we need to know the marginal product schedule ofeach type of
capital. We assume that asset demandsare Cobb-Douglas: a 1 percent
increase in the cost of capital wifi reduce asset demand by1 percent.11 Since
11The loss in production efficiency depends on the responsiveness ofinvestment demand to78Fullerton & Lyon
we assume that firmsdemand capital as long as the marginal product
exceeds its cost, this assumption effectively providesall marginal product
schedules as well. We use these marginal productschedules to show how
much more output would be produced byshifting capital toward the
locations with a high cost of capital (and highmarginal product) and away
from locations with a low cost of capital (and lowmarginal product). That
is, we calculate the additional real value of outputthat could be produced
with a given total stock of capital, if it were simplyreallocated to more
productive locations and used more efficiently.
These calculations are similar to those of Gravelle(1982) and Auerbach
(1983) for different types of equipment and structuresunder the old law.
They represent interasset distortions only anddo not include additional
misallocations between the corporate sector and noncorporatesector or
distortions of saving decisions, risk-bearing,financial choices, housing,
and labor markets.12 Fullerton, Lyon, and Rosen(1984) perform similar
calculations, including equipment, structures, inventories,and land. Ful-
lerton and Henderson (1986) include intersectoraldistortions and housing,
but none of these studies considers intangible assets.In the previous
section we calculated large amounts of intangiblecapital, and in the next
section we calculate revised costs of interassetdistortions.
4. WELFARE RESULTS UNDERALTERNATIVE
TAX REGIMES
The cost of capital for different assets under theTRA are first compared
with prior law and a modification of prior law thatmerely repeals the ITC
(Repeal ITC). Under prior law, firms faced acombined federal and state
statutory corporate tax rate of 0.495 and wereeligible for an ITC of 10
percent on most equipment and certain structures(as classified in the
National Income and Product Accounts). Tax depreciationfor equipment is
represented by an exponential rate of 0.34, a figure that isless generous
than the 0.38 rate under TRA because the basis isreduced by half the ITC.
The present value of depreciation allowancefor equipment at an 8.5
percent nominal after-tax discount rate underprior law is 2 percent less
than under TRA, indicating that in the absenceof the half-basis adjustment
the change in the pretax return of each type of asset. The greaterthe responsiveness of
demand to changes in this rate of return, the greater is the efficiencycost of tax distortions.
Fullerton and Henderson (1986) provide some evidence on thesensitivity of the efficiency cost
to this parameter.
12These calculations also assume that all corporate assets areseparable in production.
Feldstein (1985) and others have pointed out that particularsubstitutabifity relationships
among assets could make nonuniform taxation moreefficient.of prior law (a 5 percent reduction in the value of depreciation allowances),
depreciation allowance would have been more accelerated under prior law
than under TRA. Tax depreciation of structures is represented byan
exponential rate of 0.135, providing depreciation allowances thatare 30
percent greater in present value than under TRA. Other tax parametersare
the same as in Table 3. Repeal of the credit is modeled identicallyto prior
law, except the ITC rate is zero for all assets.
The cost of capital for each type of capital under each of the threetax
regimes is shown in Table 413 Because of the ITC, the cost of capital is
lower under prior law than under TRA for equipment, while becauseof the
higher statutory tax rate, the cost of capital is higher under prior law for
structures, inventories, and land. Because of expensing, however, the cost
of capital always equals the real net return for intangible assets. Repeal of
the ITC raises the cost of capital for equipment by two-thirds but leaves
other assets unaffected.
Average measures of the cost of capital also are shown in Table 4 for all
tangible capital and for all capital, including advertising and R & D intan-
gible capital. Under TRA and Repeal fTC, all tangible assets have similar
costs of capital, indicating that there is likely to be little loss in productive
efficiency due to misallocation of capitalacross the different types of
tangible capital. Major differences in the cost of capital between tangible
and intangible capital in all three tax regimes, however,may be a signifi-
cant source of production inefficiency.
Not shown separately in the table, but included in the overall averages, is the cost of capital
under prior law for stn.ictures eligible for the ITC. This cost of capital is estimatedto be 6.98
percent.
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TABLE 4








Equipment 5.23 8.70 7.25
Structures 8.47 8.47 8.08
Inventories 9.68 9.68 8.06
Land 10.04 10.04 8.42
Average for all tangible assets 7.52 9.09 7.92
Advertising 4.50 4.50 4.50
R & D capital 4.50 4.50 4.50
Average for all capital 7.19 8.49 7.5380Fullerton & Lyon
TABLE 5
The Efficiency Cost of Interasset Distortions under Alternative Tax
Regimes
No intangible capital
Billions of Percent Billions of Percent
1983 dollars of GNP 1983 dollars of GNP
With advertising and
R & D intangible capital
4.1 The Inclusion of Intangible Capital
Previous studies have calculated the cost of the loss inproduction efficiency
of differential taxation among tangible assets. Because wewish to show
how this welfare loss changes with the introduction ofintangible capital,
we first calculate the welfare lossfor the three tax regimes assuming no
intangible capital.
Our findings under the assumption of no intangiblecapital are similar to
those of previous research. Under prior law, the annualwelfare loss from
differential taxation is $9.8 billion per year. This cost is 13 percentof
corporate tax revenue in 1983, or 0.3 percent of GNP.With repeal of the
ITC, distortions among tangible assets are greatlyreduced, and the welfare
loss falls to $0.7 billion. The TRA, by reducing the statutorycorporate tax
rate, provides some further reduction in interassetdistortions, and the
welfare loss falls to $0.4 billion. In the absence of intangiblecapital, TRA or
repeal of the credit appears quite successful in creating alevel playing field.
Next, we repeat these calculations for the three taxregimes using our
central estimate of the intangible capital stock attributable toadvertising
and R & D. Under all three tax regimes, the addition ofthese untaxed assets
increases the interasset distortions and the welfare loss measures.(The
addition of any capital with a cost of capital different fromthe average will
increase our measure of the welfare loss.) The cost of interassetdistortions
under prior law increases to $12.8 billion; underrepeal of the ITC it
increases to $6.7 billion; and under TRA it increases to$4.1 billion. These
welfare losses are compared in Table 5 with the previousestimates under
the assumption of no intangible capital.
An important result is that the consideration ofintangible capital does
not increase the welfare loss by the same amountin each tax regime.
Comparing the welfare losses across tax regimes, we findthat the absolute
Prior law 9.8 0.29 12.8 0.38
Repeal ITC 0.7 0.02 6.7 0.20
Tax Reform Act 0.4 0.01 4.1 0.12Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital81
welfare gain from repeal of the credit is reduced by one-third whenwe
include intangible capital, from $9.1 billion ($9.8 billion minus $0.7 billion
with no intangible capital) to $6.1 bfflion ($12.8 billion minus $6.7 billion
with intangible capital). The ITC can be viewedas less distorting in the
presence of intangible capital, because the average cost of capital for all
assets is lower.
Under the TRA the inclusion of advertising and R & D intangiblecapital
reduces the absolute welfare improvement over prior law only slightly,
from $9.5 billion ($9.8 billion minus $0.4 billion) to $8.7 bfflion ($12.8 billion
minus $4.1 billion). As under repeal of the ITC, intangible capital adds
more of a distortion under TRA than under prior law, but the reduction in
the statutory corporate tax rate mitigates this effect. Thestatutory rate
reduction lowers the cost of capital for all positively taxed assets, but the
cost of capital remains unchanged for intangible capital with azero effective
tax rate. Therefore, TRA still provides significant efficiency gains relative to
prior law.
As mentioned in section 2, changes in assumed rates of depreciation for
advertising and R & D could nearly double or reduce by one-halfour
measure of the stock of these assets. More importantly, this study omits
many other forms of intangible capital. Because the actual level of intangi-
ble capital may be much greater than we have measured here,we also
calculate the welfare loss under the three tax regimes for variations in the
level of intangible capital between zero and twelve timesour measured
intangible capital stock. Our results show that inclusion of greater amounts
of intangible capital increases the welfare loss from clistortionarytaxation
under each tax regime. Under prior law, if the actual intangible capital stock
is four times larger than our measured intangible capital stock, the welfare
loss is nearly double the measure in studies that omit intangible capital
($19.2 billion). Figure 1 shows how increases in the level of intangible
capital increase the welfare loss measure under each tax regime.
Further, we find that if the actual level of intangible capital is between
four and five times our measured level, repeal of the ITC results ina loss of
welfare. For these magnitudes of intangible capital, theaverage cost of
capital is low enough that repeal raises the cost of equipmentaway from
the average instead of toward the average.
Repeal of the credit in combination with the corporate rate reduction of
TRA, however, results in efficiency gains relative to prior law for all levels
of intangible capital modeled. The absolute improvement in production
efficiency declines from $8.7 billion at our measured level of advertising
and R & D intangible capital to $5.6 billion when intangible capital is
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FIGURE 1. The Efficiency Cost of Interasset Distortionsunder
Alternative Tax Regimes for Varying Levels of IntangibleCapital
4.2 Further Sensitivity Analysis
The favorable tax treatment for R & D is oftenjustified as a proper
correction for positive externalities generated by R & D. Inthis view, firms
are unable to appropriate allof the returns from the research they
undertake. Competitors or the world at large may benefit fromthe R & D
performed by a firm. Part or all of this effect might be offsetby the fact that
we ignore the incremental R & Dcredit. Under TRA, firms can receive a 20
percent credit for qualifying R & D expendituresexceeding a base period
amount. Because R & D expenditures increasethe base for calculating
future credits, however, the marginal incentive of this credit is verydifficult
to model. We abstract from it here, but this omissionis equivalent to the
assumption that the marginal incentive of the R & D creditexactly offsets
any positive externalities from R & D.
Suppose, however, that these spifiover benefits are even greaterthan the
marginal incentive of the R & D credit. To be specific, assumethe marginal
return to society from R & D is 50 percent greaterthan the private after-tax
return of 4.50 percent (i.e., 6.75 percent).For all other assets we continue
to assume no externalities. Under thisassumption, the pretax return to
R & D including the externality is closer tothat of all tangible capital,
causing welfare losses to be lower than shown inTable 5 or Figure 1. At our
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measured level of intangible capital, the welfare loss underTRA and prior
law is about $2.0 biffion lower than in Table5, and under repeal of the ITC
it is $3.0 billion lower than in Table 5. The absolute welfaregain of TRA
relative to prior law is therefore the sameas shown in Table 5, while it is
slightly greater for repeal of the ITC relativeto prior law. At higher
assumed levels of intangible capital (but holding the levelof R & D fixed),
the welfare losses are only slightly lower than thoseshown in Figure 1.
Next, we consider a modification to the taxtreatment of advertising
expenditures. One proposal considered during tax reformand again
during this year's budget reconcifiation isa partial disallowance of the
deduction for advertising expenditures. Here,we consider a modification
of TRA that provides a deduction for only 80percent of advertising
expenditures. This disallowance is equivalent in present valueto capitali7-
ing all advertising expenditures and allowing themto be depreciated at a 34
percent exponential rate, comparable to that for equipment under TRA.To
calculate the new cost of capital for advertising,we assume advertising
capital has an economic exponential depreciation rate of 33percent. The
partial disallowance of advertising expenditures results ina cost of capital
of 9.2 percent, or an effective tax rate of 51percent. This tax cost is higher
than that of other assets because the 80 percent deduction(or equivalently
34 percent rate of depredation on historical cost) isnot enough to cover
economic depreciation at 4 percent inflation.
At our measured level of intangible capital (and assumingno externali-
ties for R & D), welfare losses under TRA witha partial deduction for
advertising decrease from $4.1 billion to $3.0 bfflion. Atgreater levels of
intangible capital (while holding constant the level of advertisingcapital),
these welfare gains are smaller.14
Finally, some believe that advertisingmay generate negative externalities,
that is, yield a sodal rate of return below its privaterate of return. Some
advertising may simply redistribute sales between competingbrands but
provide no net increase in total sales. Under the assumption that advertising
generates negative externalities, welfare losses under all three tax regimes
would be greater. A tax on advertising would raise the sodalrate of return on
advertising toward that of other assets and result in welfare gains.
14 In fact, if the total stock of intangible capital isat least eight times greater than our measured
stock of advertising and R & D intangible capital, the partial deduction for advertisingactually
decreases welfare. This result occurs because the cost of capital for advertising isgreater than
the cost of capital for all other assets. With sufficiently largeamounts of untaxed intangible
capital, it is more distorting to tax advertising at greater thanaverage rates than to leave it
untaxed. At any level of intangible capital, however, a less restrictive partial deductionfor
advertising would always generate efficiency gains.84Fullerton & Lyon
5. CONCLUSION
Intangible capital has escaped the attention of many taxresearchers and tax
policymakers. As a consequence, discussions of a "levelplaying field" have
concentrated on the relative taxation of equipment, structures,and other
tangible assets. They have ignored the significant taxadvantages of
expensing investments in advertising, R & D,and other intangible assets.
We have shown that the consideration ofintangible capital renders invalid
many of the standard viewsabout what constitutes an efficiency increasing
reform. For sufficiently large levels of intangiblecapital, repeal of the ITC
can actually increase the costof distorting firms' choices among assets.
Importantly, however, we find that the TRA still reduces thecost of these
distortions relative to prior law.
The point of this chapter is not to provide refinedestimates of the welfare
costs of taxes on income from capital.Indeed, other studies calculate
detailed effects of specific tax provisions on distortions amongassets,
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors,between business capital
and housing, among sources of finance, or between presentand future
consumption. They might use more sophisticatedformulas that account for
estimated asset demands or particular relationships amongassets in
production. Other studies do not consider intangiblecapital, however. This
study uses very simple calculations to show thatthis omission has a major
effect on measures of distortions among assetsthat were a major concern in
discussions of tax reform.
These results do not imply that concerns aboutthe level playing fields
were misplaced, however.Perhaps they were only too limited by consid-
ering only tangible capital. The model in thisstudy starts with the
presumption that corporate capital is allocated mostefficiently when all
types of capital have the same pretaxreturn (or, in the presence of
externalities, the same social return). Withunequal effective tax rates,
efficiency can be increased by any reformthat raises the lowest effective
rates and uses the revenue to reduce thehighest effective rates. Repeal of
the ITC may have raised the low effective tax ratefor equipment and
provided revenue for rate reduction, but it did notdeal with the asset
having the lowest effective tax rate. Further efficiencygains are possible in
this model. If advertising and R & D do create assetsthat depreciate over
time, then expensing provides a zero effective taxrate for that asset. Any
cutback from expensing, such as a partial disallowance ordelay in deduc-
tions, would raise the lowest effective tax rate, removefurther distortions,
and provide revenue that could be used toreduce or maintain lower rates.TECHNICAL APPENDIX
In the framework of Hall and Jorgenson (1967),we consider a corporation
facing a certain nominal after-tax discountrate r and inflation rate. The
firm makes a $1 marginal investment in asset) thatdepreciates exponen-
tially at rateand earns a net marginal productp1. Income from the asset is
taxed at the statutory corporate rateu. The firm receives an immediate ITC at
rateand delayed depreciation allowances on the original purchaseprice. The
present value of these allowances per dollar of investment isz1, where the firm
discounts future nominal allowances by the nominalafter-tax discount rate.
For further discussion of these assumptions,see Bradford and Fullerton
(1981).
The profit-maximizing firm continues to make suchinvestments until, in
competitive equilibrium, the cost of the asset is just equalto the present
discounted value of after-tax returns and taxsavings from the asset. This
equilibrium condition is used to solve for thenet marginal product or
pretax return p1. as a function of other parameters:
(1)
This cost is gross of taxes but net of depreciation. Thispretax return can
easily vary among assets with different creditrates k1, depreciation rates
andlor allowances z1. With no ITC, however, depreciationcould be set so
that the firm receives economic allowances at replacementcost for every
asset. The firm then discounts by the real net returns = r - r. In this case,
z1 equals 6j /(s + ô), and p1 reduces to s/(1- u) for all assets. Alternatively,
equation (1) shows that expensing all assets (k1= 0 and z1 = 1) provides p
equal to s for all assets. If the total corporate capitalstock is fixed, the tax
system does not distort its allocation in either of thesetwo special cases.
Other tax rules also can provide thesame p for all assets, as shown in
Bradford (1980) and Brown (1981).
In general, taxes do distort the allocation of capitalamong assets. In this
paper, we follow Hendershott and Hu (1980) and Gravelle (1982)in
measuring the associated welfare cost bya more recent version of the
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where Içis the stock of asset j in the distortedequilibrium, T<1 is the stock
in the undistorted equffibrium, p1(I(1) is thenet marginal product given the86Fullerton & Lyon
level K,,is the cost of capital in the undistorted equilibrium,and N is the
number of assets. To measure W, therefore, we need toknow how the use of
K depends upon its cost p3. Econometric studiesreviewed in Jorgenson (1974)
suggest that firms' total use of capital changes byapproximately 1 percent for
each 1 percent change in its cost. This cost couldconceivably be gross or net of
depreciation. Gross costs are often used in empiricalwork that test whether
gross output is a Cobb-Douglasfunction of capital and labor. However, the
use of net costs p3 in equation(2) guarantees a fixed total stock of capital under
all reallocations. No empirical work hasmeasured price elasticities separately
for each of the capital assets used in thisstudy, but we assume that the
demand for each K has unitary elasticity with respect to itsprice p.
Expenditure on each type of capital is a constant under ourassumptions,
sop1K = p$K7 for any K. Thus, we can substitutep71<7IKj for p(K) in equa-







For the distorted equilibrium under old law,capital costs p7 are given by
equation (1) using parameters for old lawderived in King and Fullerton
(1984). We obtain the distorted capital allocation1(7 for 1983 from data in
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), more recent issuesof the Survey of current
business, the Federal Reserve Board's Balancesheets for the LI. S. economy, and
our constructed stocks ofintangible capital. We estimate the long-run
distorted allocation for the other tax plans usingthe same Cobb-Douglas
reactions to changes in the cost of capital.Under the TRA, for example,
is given by capital expenditures (K1p1) under1983 law divided by the cost of
capital (p under TRA.
For the undistorted or counterfactualequffibrium, capital costs should be
the same for all assets. Our particular choiceforis the capital-weighted
average of p7 from the distortedequilibrium, such that both equffibria have
the same aggregate pretax return, the same aggregateafter-tax return, and
the same total tax revenue.
Once we specify r,-, and tax parameters foreach law, equations (1) and
(3) provide the cost of capital for each assetand the efficiency cost of
distortions, as reported in the text.
REFERENCES
Auerbach, Alan J. 1983. Corporate taxation in the United States.Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 2: 451-505.Tax Neutrality and Intangible Capital87
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., and Alan S. Murray. 1987. Showdownat Gucci Gulch:
Lawmakers, lobbyists, and the unlikely triumph of tax reform. NewYork: Random
House.
Bosworth, Bany P. 1985. Taxes and the investmentrecovery. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity: 1-38.
Bradford, David F. 1980. Tax neutrality and theinvestment tax credit. In The
economics of taxation, eds. Henry J. Aaron and MichaelJ. Boskin. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Bradford, David F., and Don Fullerton. 1981. Pitfalls in theconstruction and use of
effective tax rates. In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation ofincome f-rom capital, ed.
C. R. Hulten. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Brown, E. Cary. 1981. The 'net'versus the 'gross' investment tax credit. In
Depreciation, inflation, and the taxation of income from capital,ed. C. R. Hulten.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Clarkson, Kenneth W. 1977. Intangible capital andrates of return: Effects of
research and promotion on profitability. Washington, D.C.: AmericanEnterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research.
Cordes, Joseph J., Harry S. Watson, andJ. Scott Hauger. 1987. Effects of tax reform
on high technology firms. National Tax Journal 40: 373-91.
Eisner, Robert, Steven H. Albert, and Martin A. Sullivan. 1984.The new incremen-
tal tax credit for R & D: Incentive or disincentive? NationalTax Journal 37: 171-83.
Feldstein, Martin. 1985. The second best theory of capitaltaxation. NBER, Working
Paper no. 1781.
Feldstein, Martin, Louis Dicks-Mireaux, and James Poterba.1983. The effective tax
rate and the pretax rate of return. Journal of Public Economics 21:129-58.
Fullerton, Don. 1984. Which effective tax rate? National TaxJournal 37: 23-41.
Fullerton, Don, Robert Gifiette, and James Macide. 1987.Investment incentives
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In Compendium oftax research, 1986. Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Treasury Department.
Fullerton, Don and Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson. 1986.A disaggregate equilib-
rium model of the tax distortions among assets, sectors, andindustries. NBER,
Working Paper no. 1905.
Fullerton, Don, Andrew B. Lyon, and RichardJ. Rosen. 1984. Uncertainty, welfare
cost and the 'adaptability' of U.S. corporate taxes. The ScandinavianJournal of
Economics 86: 229-43.
Gordon, Roger H., James R. Hines, and Lawrence H. Summers.1987. Notes on the
tax treatment of structures. In The effects of taxationon capital accumulation, ed.
Martin Feldstein. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Grabowski, Henry G., and Dennis C. Mueller. 1978.Industrial research and
development, intangible capital stocks, and firm profitrates. The Bell Journal of
Economics 9: 328-43.
Gravelle, Jane G. 1982. Effects of the 1981 depreciationrevisions on the taxation of
income from business capital. National Tax Journal 35:1-20.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. Tax policy andinvestment behavior.
American Economic Review 57: 391-414.
Harberger, Arnold C. 1966. Efficiency effects of taxeson income from capital. In
Effects of corporation income tax, ed. M. Krzyzaniak. Detroit:Wayne State Univer-
sity Press.
Hendershott, Patric H., and Sheng-Cheng Hu. 1980.Government-induced biases88Fullerton & Lyon
in the allocation of the stock of fixedcapital in the United States. In Capital,
efficiency, and growth, ed. George von Furstenberg.Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
Hulten, Charles R., and Frank C. Wykoff. 1981.The measurement of economic
depreciation. In Depreciation, inflation, and the taxationof income from capital, ed.
C. R. Hulten. Washington, D.C.: The Urban InstitutePress.
Hulten, Charles R., and James W. Robertson. 1984. Thetaxation of high technology
industries. National Tax Journal 37: 327-45.
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1974. Investment andproduction: A review. In Frontiers of
quantitative economics, vol. II, eds. M. Intriligatorand D. Kendrick. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Martin A. Sullivan. 1981.Inflation and capital recovery in
the United States. In Depreciation, inflation, and thetaxation of income from capital,
ed. C. R. Hulten. Washington, D.C.: The Urban InstitutePress.
King, Mervyn A., and Don Fullerton, eds. 1984.The taxation of income from capital: A
comparative study of the U.S., U.K., Sweden, and West Germany.Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Lindenberg, Eric B., and Stephen A. Ross. 1981. Tobin's qratio and industrial
organization. Journal of Business 54: 1-32.
Mundstock, George. 1987. Taxation of businessintangible capital. University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 135: 1179-1263.
Summers, Lawrence H. 1981. Taxation and corporateinvestment: A q-theoiy
approach. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 67-140.
1987. Should tax reform level the playing field?Proceedings of the National Tax
Association-Tax Institute of America meetings of November1986, pp. 119-25.